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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) applications, systems and services
are subject to law. We argue that for the IoT to develop
lawfully, there must be technical mechanisms that allow the
enforcement of specied policy, such that systems align with
legal realities. The audit of policy enforcement must assist
the apportionment of liability, demonstrate compliance with
regulation, and indicate whether policy correctly captures le-
gal responsibilities. As both systems and obligations evolve
dynamically, this cycle must be continuously maintained.
This poses a huge challenge given the global scale of the
IoT vision. The IoT entails dynamically creating new ser-
vices through managed and exible data exchange.
Data management is complex in this dynamic environment,
given the need to both control and share information, often
across federated domains of administration.
We see middleware playing a key role in managing the
IoT. Our vision is for a middleware-enforced, unied policy
model that applies end-to-end, throughout the IoT. This is
because policy cannot be bound to things, applications, or
administrative domains, since functionality is the result of
composition, with dynamically formed chains of data ows.
We have investigated the use of Information Flow Control
(IFC) to manage and audit data ows in cloud computing;
a domain where trust can be well-founded, regulations are
more mature and associated responsibilities clearer. We feel
that IFC has great potential in the broader IoT context.
However, the sheer scale and the dynamic, federated nature
of the IoT pose a number of signicant research challenges.
Keywords
Law, regulation, policy specication and enforcement, audit
1 Introduction and context
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a subject of wide publicity
and speculation. The ISO [4] describes the IoT as\An infras-
tructure of interconnected objects, people, systems and infor-
mation resources together with intelligent services to allow
them to process information of the physical and the virtual
world and react." This broad vision embodies the concept of
ubiquitous/pervasive computing: the seamless integration of
sensor and actuation technologies into a wide-scale (global)
systems environment, capable of reacting appropriately to
changes in context to provide desired functionality.
The notion of the IoT is becoming mainstream: `bring-
ing the world online' impacts individuals, groups, organ-
isations, governments, and society as a whole. The con-
nected systems infrastructure is envisaged as supporting a
vast number of dierent applications, in domains such as
smart cities, healthcare, trac monitoring, energy eciency,
and personal lifestyle management. All of these applications
are intended to be customisable to specic needs. They also
raise complex questions of responsibility regarding data, par-
ticularly given that sensors, IoT devices and their enabling
systems bear constant witness to our everyday lives.
At the same time, the IoT is a subject of increasing po-
litical and legal interest [38], not least because of the scale
of personal and/or otherwise sensitive data that it entails,
raising a range of private law issues, particularly under data
protection, privacy, contract and tort law. This is what
we envisage by \legally-compliant IoT". For the avoidance
of doubt, our motivation is not to instrument the IoT for
criminal investigations or national security purposes. Sur-
reptitious actions, such as those by malicious parties and
government agencies, are beyond the scope of this paper.
Fig. 1 shows the big picture. Law and regulation, re-
ecting responsibilities and obligations, together with per-
sonal preferences, must be embodied in policy, which tech-
nical mechanisms must enforce system-wide. Such policy
must be continually aligned with evolving law and regula-
tion, and the audit of its enforcement, particularly regarding
data ow and processing, is necessary to demonstrate com-
pliance. Following this model, which is far from current
practice, the \big idea" we put forward is that a legally-
compliant IoT is a real possibility, enabled by decentralised
policy enforcement on a middleware foundation. Middleware
is an ideal basis for such functionality, as it operates across
system components in an application-independent manner.
Most current middleware focuses on enabling functional-
ity. Our idea is that middleware must go further, to enable
distributed compliance. This area is relatively unexplored
by the middleware community, but is crucial to moving for-
ward, particularly given the emerging regulatory landscape.
1.1 Dynamic processing chains in the IoT
Realising functionality in the IoT potentially involves long
processing chains, comprising many system components (see
Fig. 2), often representing a system-of-systems. IoT architec-
tures include physical devices (sensors, actuators); gateways
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Figure 1: A high-level overview of decentralised policy enforcement in the IoT
(hubs, phones, domain administration agents); and private/
hybrid/public cloud services, for storage, processing and an-
alytics. All might be managed by dierent parties, with dif-
ferent interests and obligations. The chain of components
delivering functionality might vary, even for instances of the
same application; e.g. a mobile application may interact di-
rectly with `things' in the local environment, which vary
according to location. Further, the same components can
be used for dierent purposes, in dierent circumstances.
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Figure 2: An IoT functional component chain
In the IoT, management policy relates to personal or or-
ganisational preferences, regulatory and contractual require-
ments, and context. Given the above, where system com-
ponents can be (re)used and interact (exchange data) in
unforeseen and customised ways, these policies must be as-
certained, respected and enforced throughout the highly dy-
namic environment. This requires supporting infrastructure
to provide the means for policy to set constraints and re-
congure system components, to ensure that interactions
properly accord with higher-level goals and obligations.
1.2 Data-centric access control, end-to-end
Traditional access controls (authentication and authorisa-
tion) tend to operate only within the scope of a partic-
ular application/system, with enforcement only at specic
points. While these controls are needed in the IoT, it is also
necessary for system infrastructure to enable the control and
management of data, end-to-end, under a consistent, contin-
uously enforced policy regime, as data moves along any pro-
cessing chains. Information Flow Control (IFC) augments
traditional access control by providing continuous, system-
wide, end-to-end ow control based on labelled properties of
the data. We propose that IFC should be vigorously inves-
tigated for use in the IoT to complement existing security
regimes, as explained further in x6 and x7.
Data analytics are an important part of the IoT, for man-
aging context (\detect/respond" event-based architectures),
and enabling new services and eciencies. This is another
reason why data-centric controls are needed (in addition to
application/system-centric controls) that also facilitate data
provenance tracking. Once IFC is deployed, audit can easily
be supported since a record can potentially be made of every
attempted data transfer or access [68].
1.3 Summary and big idea
The IoT's growth will be restricted unless a means is devel-
oped to allow parties to meet their legal obligations. We
argue that policies for data control must be consistently ap-
plied throughout the IoT, reecting individual preferences,
rights, regulation and law. This requires data sharing to
be controlled both locally and within application/domain
boundaries, as well as when data ows through IoT system
chains (end-to-end). Since policy is often context-aware, and
can change/evolve, systems will require reconguration to
ensure that obligations continue to be met, under changing
circumstances. Audit, traceability and transparency tools
that can operate system-wide are important for account-
ability and demonstrating compliance. As regulation in-
creases for the IoT it becomes clear that a feedback loop
via technically-enforced policy is needed, as shown in Fig. 1.
Our big idea is for a legally-compliant IoT, where the sup-
porting infrastructure enables the enforcement of policy to
allow parties to demonstrably meet their responsibilities.
Middleware can support secure, managed (i.e. driven by
policy), data sharing [82]. There is a clear role for middle-
ware that enables dynamic, external reconguration, allow-
ing management policy to be applied within the federated,
decentralised and long-lived systems environment of the IoT.
As a starting point, we feel that IFC, which is a data-centric
security technology for continuous data ow control, shows
promise in enabling end-to-end enforcement. IFC is not a
new concept, but has not been applied in wide-scale dis-
tributed systems.
Clearly, any big idea must be grounded in experience with
technologies that show promise. In previous work [68,69] we
have demonstrated the potential of IFC in a cloud context;
however, extending the approach to the IoT is challenging,
given that cloud often represents a single administrative do-
main where trust can be well-founded, regulations are rela-
tively mature and associated responsibilities are clear.
In this paper, we present early ideas and challenges con-
cerning how IFC concepts, coupled with a recongurable,
distributed systems middleware could apply in heteroge-
neous, untrusted, dynamic, and wide-scale systems environ-
ments, as a means towards enabling a legally-compliant IoT.
2 IoT architecture
The term IoT is used broadly, in a variety of contexts, from
communication mediums, sensor networks and pervasive com-
puting, to HCI and more. We have highlighted the need for
dynamic, yet controlled, secure data sharing to realise the
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broad IoT vision. This means that data ows must be man-
aged, even in the presence of an ever-greater number of sys-
tem components (representing communication endpoints)|
so-called hyperconnectivity|and the increasing instrumen-
tation of the physical world through ongoing improvements
in and deployments of sensor/actuator technology.
Our discussion is therefore in the context of interactions
(communication) between `things', as shown in Fig. 1. In
line with the ITU [2] and ISO [4] denitions, we use thing to
refer to an entity, physical or virtual,1 capable of interaction
in its own right; thereby encompassing sensors, devices, ap-
plications/services (standalone or cloud-hosted), gateways,
etc. Much research has been carried out on communication
protocols for the IoT (e.g. to support low-powered devices
in an IoT context) and software is becoming available, such
as 6LoWPAN [57], COaP [80], etc. Policy at this lower-level
concerns communication and/or resource constraints; our
focus here is on higher-level data sharing.
2.1 Subsystems and gateways
Though many entities capable of communication make up
the IoT, not all operate as \rst-class citizens", because:
(1) They may be part of a subsystem that is bespoke or
closed, rather than open or interoperable, e.g. as part of a
legacy system or because of the manufacturer's policy;
(2) They may be extremely resource limited; or
(3) They may be part of a self-contained administrative do-
main or network, limited in scope, e.g. a workplace, a propri-
etary sensor network or industrial control system, or simply
running behind a rewall [85]. This can be dynamic, in that
networks may be ad hoc (e.g. mesh-networks), and `things'
can be mobile, e.g. someone's phone being directly accessible
when in public (through their mobile provider), but behind
a gateway when connected to an internal network at work.
We consider such entities to be part of subsystems that
participate in the IoT via gateways, see Fig. 2. Gateways
manage system boundaries, operating as `hubs' that manage
interactions on behalf of the subsystems they front, and/or
providing capability (and policy) management services ap-
propriate for the local environment. We therefore consider
such gateways as `things', as they represent a point in which
policy can be enforced. Conversely, a single device could be
considered as several `things', e.g. a phone can host several
applications, each capable of direct, external communica-
tion, and therefore subject to separate policy regimes.
2.2 Cloud services within the IoT
Cloud services are increasingly playing a role in supporting
the IoT. A recent survey showed 34 out of 39 IoT architec-
tures investigated included cloud and/or centralised services
in some form [55]. Cloud services can be used:
(1) For processing and storage, especially when `things' are
low-powered and/or mobile; for archiving, and for aggregat-
ing sensor and other data and performing analytics;
(2) To allow IoT data to be integrated with more traditional
services such as electronic health records;
(3) To operate as a coordinator/mediator, managing and
controlling `things' as appropriate to context.
There are ongoing issues regarding the security of cloud
computing [90]. In [85] we discuss the security issues specic
to cloud-supported IoT. Our current research is exploring the
1Many denitions include `virtual' aspects, as the delivery
of IoT services involves a number of software components.
potential of IFC to provide data protection with controlled
sharing in cloud computing, i.e. to manage intra- and inter-
cloud interactions. We outline this work in x8, as a basis for
exploring IFC for securing IoT data ows.
Any work aiming to incorporate cloud services into IoT
must take account of emerging cloud developments, such
as `cloudlets' [78] and `droplets' [26] that enable smaller,
mobile, and personal/application-specic clouds. These aim
at supporting emerging IoT environments, and can simply
be considered `things' for the purposes of our discussion.
3 Need for managed data sharing
Much IoT research has focussed on specic applications,
and/or the technical aspects in bringing `things' online, e.g.
protocols, radio and power management, etc. There has been
comparatively little attention on user-level security concerns
(or other aspects of control) across ranges of `things', par-
ticularly relating to managing data sharing in this dynamic
world, where `things' can be (re)used to realise new, possi-
bly unforeseen functionality. Six concerns are of particular
relevance when considering IoT data sharing.
Concern 1: IoT involves personal and sensitive data.
In the IoT, sensors will generate volumes of data relating to
many aspects of life. Indeed, highly personal data will drive
many envisaged IoT services. In contrast with traditional
IT, the data sources may be more diverse, ad hoc, mobile
and unmanaged. There is a great deal of law and regulation,
national and regional, focussing on personal data [54], and
the need for a sound legal basis (often, explicit consent) for
the collection, maintenance and use of information that is
identiable to an individual. Commercially sensitive data
may also arise in the IoT; again, regulatory and contrac-
tual constraints may apply. Determining responsibility and
demonstrating compliance remains an ongoing issue [86].
Concern 2: IoT involves actuation. Actuation en-
tails physical, real-world impact. Error, malice or misman-
agement of actuation data ows (commands) can be catas-
trophic, and naturally entail legal consequences [35]. Flows
may be to vehicles and smart homes, and also software up-
dates for devices.
Concern 3: Policy persistence through chains. Be-
cause component interactions can be dynamically orches-
trated, and IoT-component chains can be long (Fig. 2), it can
be uncertain where data has owed and how it is used. Once
data has left one's control|i.e. it is `out of their hands'|it is
hard to trace. Generally, policies should persist throughout
the data's entire lifecycle. This also helps with the amalga-
mation of data with dierent policies. To demonstrate that
policies have been respected it is necessary to record and
audit the ow of data.
Concern 4: Data quality and provenance. Qual-
ity of data relates to its source, e.g. user input, data from
an approved sensor, any intermediate processing operations,
and whether it is standards-compliant. Provenance concerns
making data lifecycles visible. Again, this makes it necessary
to record the ow of data.
Concern 5: Data aggregation, inference and analyt-
ics. Data in the IoT is diverse, coming from dierent users
and sources. Data may be benign in isolation, but sensi-
tive when combined; e.g. an anonymisation algorithm may
yield data that, when combined with other data, leads to
individual reidentication [62]. That is, subtle, unforeseen
inferences can arise. Data analytics (often on `big data') is
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commonplace, e.g. to prole people's spending habits. IoT
increases the scope for data analytics, but with less visibility
over the outcomes [62]. Such issues motivate the need for
data ows to be managed and visible, system-wide.
Concern 6: Customisation and Context. `Things' will
be used in dierent ways, for dierent purposes, e.g. a tele-
vision that monitors viewing habits, designed for targeted
advertising, may also allow a clinician to monitor someone's
mental state. That is, the way `things' are coordinated, i.e.
how and when data moves between `things', can be cus-
tomised to achieve particular functional goals. Such con-
cerns are context-dependent, e.g. the data from someone's
medical monitoring devices may ow only to their local per-
sonal applications and storage services. In an emergency,
\break-glass" policy overrides normal security constraints,
alerting emergency services and (say) a family member, and
replugging the sensor-data streams to make them available
to the emergency response team [81]. More generally, per-
haps a nurse should be able to access patients' data only
when detected in the context of their homes. In both exam-
ples, security levels are adjusted|recongured|to accord
with changes in context. In practice, many adaptations will
be based on location and the local environment.
3.1 Policy for managing data
The IoT requires these concerns to be managed, in accor-
dance with preferences and requirements. Policy encapsu-
lates a set of concerns, dening the actions to take in par-
ticular circumstances to eect some outcome. Policy is of-
ten represented in rules and processes governing system be-
haviour, dening the actions to take when situations arise.
Much systems research on policy concerns lower-level as-
pects [88], such as resource allocation and/or quality-of-
service in network management. In contrast, in an IoT ar-
chitecture, policy must also capture higher-level (user) con-
cerns, because these drive the interactions involving data ex-
change, andmust reect the laws and regulations that
apply. Moreover, policies must be continuously aligned
with changing regulations and user preferences. Therefore,
to realise the IoT vision, policies must be dynamic in nature,
operating to regulate data exchanges. This may involve en-
forcing policies at various levels of the technology stack (see
x8.2.2). It is also important that auditing occurs so that
compliance with policy can be demonstrated and account-
ability established. Related work on policy is summarised in
x10, but there remain a number of open challenges regarding
the scale and scope of the IoT, as this paper explores.
4 Common security approaches
We now consider the extent to which the most common\o-
the-shelf" security mechanisms can meet the data sharing
concerns just described. x10 considers less established work.
Access control (AC) comprises authentication (identity)
and authorisation (the right to perform an action). For the
IoT, authentication schemes should apply system-wide (see
x9), meaning certicate-based (PKI) models could be used.
Authorisation policy might target a particular entity, a role,
and/or some aspect of context, e.g. parametrised roles can
capture details of an entity, its functionality and context [10].
AC clearly plays an important part in governing systems.
However, there are two related considerations for AC in IoT:
1. ACs are applied at specic Policy Enforcement Points
(PEPs), authenticating and authorising a particular action
(e.g. data exchange). While this protects the specic (peer-
based) interaction, there is generally no subsequent control
over data ows beyond the point of enforcement; and
2. AC tends only to be relevant within a particular ap-
plication and system context, e.g. the AC of a database is
dierent from that of the le system, and similarly they will
vary depending on the entity, e.g. the AC of a cloud ser-
vice provider targets dierent principals from those of the
tenant's application it hosts. There are no continuous con-
trols beyond the PEPs, nor guarantees that any data pol-
icy regime applies consistently throughout the infrastruc-
ture. For example, database tables may be shared between
several applications. Although the applications enforce AC
with their users, they may not have the same AC policies
when operating on common data.
PKI. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be useful in en-
abling a wide-scale security regime. One can envisage a
PKI where `things' have private keys and public key cer-
ticates, signed by a certicate authority linking them to
their owners, who are also associated with certicates. De-
centralised trust models (a web-of-trust) are also possible,
assisting more ad hoc management by removing the need
for a central authority. X.509 certicates [30] can be used
for authentication/identication and authorisation [22] and
are widely available and well understood. PKI provides a
building block to be leveraged for a wider IoT infrastruc-
ture. Already, lightweight PKI schemes have been proposed
(e.g. [41]) that could help support low-powered IoT devices.
Encryption. There is a clear role for encrypted commu-
nication channels e.g. via Transport Layer Security (TLS),
or more lightweight versions for resource-challenged `things'
(x10). TLS relies on PKI and certicate authorities.
Application-level encryption (at data-item level) can se-
cure data beyond the application's scope, but this raises a
number of issues. First, key management (allocation, revo-
cation and distribution) is non-trivial, particularly in the IoT
where data restrictions change dynamically. Second, much
of the IoT vision is of component chains that process, ag-
gregate and analyse data. Encryption at the data-item level
precludes certain processing services (e.g. in-cloud), unless
keys are distributed. There is ongoing work on homomorphic
encryption that will allow computation on encrypted data,
but is not yet practicable for wide-scale deployment [40].
Finally, there is no logging/feedback on when data is de-
crypted. This makes it dicult to discover when, where and
how data leaks occur, hindering audit and accountability.
Proxy re-encryption involves a semi-trusted proxy that
transforms encrypted data produced by one party into a
form decryptable by another, where the proxy cannot access
the plaintext [7]. This allows third parties to manage the
data of others, without having access to the content. This
can shift key management overheads away from lightweight
`things', and potentially enables more secure orchestrations.
Dierential privacy regulates the queries on a dataset
and modies result sets to balance the provision of useful,
statistical-based results with the probability of identifying
individual records [29]. This is useful for data analytics.
Hardware Based Trust. To establish trust in a system,
the hardware cryptographic capability provided by Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM) [11] is already used. Relevant
here is how TPM can guarantee the integrity of a plat-
form and its conguration, and also certify identity [70].
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Intel SGX [3] provides an alternative to TPM-style trusted
hardware, by providing means to run a trusted computing
base in user space, above an untrusted OS kernel. Although
SGX can facilitate condentiality and integrity of data on
a local machine, during external interaction the availabil-
ity of the service cannot be protected from the underlying
OS. ARM TrustZone [77] provides yet another design point,
between the previous two, providing hardware-isolated, se-
cure and insecure \worlds" in which the CPU operates. In-
tegrity guarantees are particularly relevant in ensuring the
security behaviour of a system, e.g. \can I trust this remote
host to handle my data?" In an IoT context, such guaran-
tees are applicable to `things', e.g. helping to prevent imper-
sonation and providing trustworthy information as to their
specication and operational state, such as geographical lo-
cation [44].
Also relevant is remote attestation [47], which provides
the means to verify the integrity of a remote machine before
interacting. Such technology is increasingly common, e.g.
in virtual machines/containers on a cloud platform [17], em-
bedded systems [5], and mobile phones [61].
Summary. These mechanisms provide an essential foun-
dation on which to build the future IoT, with considerable
IoT research (see x10) dedicated to extending them. But
existing security techniques, by themselves, do not fully ad-
dress the concerns of x3, which arise from one or more of:
(1) the IoT's vast scale; (2) the variable, dynamic nature of
the environment; and (3) the need for continuous enforce-
ment, system-wide, as data ows span a range of services
and administrative domains.
5 Middleware’s role in the emerging IoT
We have discussed the requirements for controlled, dynamic
data sharing in IoT and have considered security mechanisms
of relevance. In this section we expand on the key role of
middleware in IoT, with policy enforcement as the focus.
Event-driven systems embody policy-driven behaviour [88];
for example, Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules can spec-
ify the circumstances under which systems need to be recon-
gured [87]. As mentioned, this was traditionally applied
to network management. Complex Event Processing (CEP)
engines have been developed for specic application areas,
such as nancial trading. Machine learning is gaining promi-
nence, and can be used for learning and recognising signif-
icant patterns of events that can drive actions. Regardless
of how policy is described and actions decided, our concern
is the underlying mechanisms enabling policy to maintain
appropriate system behaviour.
5.1 The need for policy-enforcing middleware
We have argued that policy is central to realising the wider
IoT vision. Encoding policy in application logic is inher-
ently limiting, as the wider vision entails components being
(re)used, orchestrated and customised in various ways, in-
cluding entirely novel uses. Policy that tends towards build-
ing silos hinders this wider vision.
Middleware (MW) is a layer of abstraction that mediates
component interactions. As MW operates across compo-
nents, it is the natural location for integrating data manage-
ment mechanisms. This enables the means for application-
related policy to operate system-wide. This is important in
an IoT context because:
 Operating across `things', MW can ensure the enforce-
ment of a common, compatible management regime
throughout the IoT provisioning chain; and
 In providing standard interfaces, MW allows `things'
to be developed without requiring policy to be dened
a priori, helping to avoid unnecessary operational silos.
For developers and designers, middleware-based policy en-
forcement means they are not burdened with maintaining
their own internal policy representation, thus removing the
impossible requirement to account for all possible uses and
operating environments for their component, and all its pos-
sible interactions. This is important for IoT, where `things'
are orchestrated to realise functionality. Also, policy man-
agement is made more tractable, since having fewer points
of enforcement reduces the propensity for errors, see x5.2.
In short, middleware should provide the mechanisms for
data security/management regimes to apply across systems,
throughout the IoT system supply chain. This is crucial for
realising the wider vision of the IoT.
5.2 Requirements of policy-driven MW
In considering policy enforcement, it is necessary to iden-
tify where control should be exercised. PEPs were intro-
duced in x4 for access control. PEPs exist throughout the
IoT (Fig. 1), with enforcement potentially occurring at each
step of a component chain (Fig. 2). This adds complexity
because:
 There is a need to enforce common policy at each con-
trol point along the entire path the data takes;
 As circumstances change, the policy at any of these
control points may need to be updated, and the chains
of ow may themselves need to change; and
 The decisions taken at each of these points must be
made visible for audit and provenance-checking.
To elaborate, these requirements involve:
Continuous, end-to-end policy enforcement. Secure,
reliable data sharing must be enforced end-to-end, through-
out the entire service provisioning chain, including any in-
termediate sub-chains.
Dynamic, context-aware reconguration. The pur-
pose of reconguration is to adapt the `always-on' nature of
the IoT to ensure compliant behaviour in changing circum-
stances. Here, reconguration may take the form of:
 Setting the security/management regime to disallow/
allow particular data exchanges, i.e. setting up an en-
vironment, privileges, IFC security context (x6); or
 Proactively taking direct security operations, such as
initiating/ceasing connections, e.g. forcing data through
a sanitiser (x7), disconnecting an employee after their
shift, or preventing a rogue `thing' from causing more
damage, e.g. by isolating or commands to shut it down.
In some circumstances, these may involve local recongu-
rations, in others, a change in security preferences must be
propagated through a range of dierent `things'.
Data provenance and audit. Providing transparency
and traceability by being able to track and audit the ow of
data throughout the system, including the policies applied,
recongurations initiated and interactions undertaken has
several purposes: (1) ensure data quality; (2) help identify
policy errors and encourage renement; and (3) demonstrate
compliance and aid accountability.
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6 Information Flow Control (IFC)
So far we have described the need for system-wide data man-
agement for the IoT, and the need for policy-driven middle-
ware. We now introduce IFC as a model for both tracking
and constraining information ows. We show IFC's poten-
tial in an IoT context (x7), before describing how IFC inte-
grated with middleware allows wide-scale application of this
data-centric management approach, thus providing a solid
foundation for building a legally-compliant IoT.
IFC research dates back to the 1970s [28] in the con-
text of centralised military systems. Here, data was classi-
ed system-wide as public, condential, secret or top-secret.
Later, decentralised IFC was proposed [60], and has formed
the basis of subsequent IFC research, including our work
on CamFlow [68, 69]. In an OS implementation, IFC can
be described as a data-centric, continuous (within the local
system), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanism.
Most IFC models, including our own, relate to two data
properties: its secrecy and its integrity ; respectively, where
the data is allowed to ow to (per Bell and LaPadula [15])
and where it can ow from (per Biba [19]). These con-
cerns are represented by associating with an entity A, two
security labels S(A) for secrecy and I(A) for integrity; ac-
tive (e.g. processes) and passive (e.g. data) entities are la-
belled. Our IFC model uses labels that comprise a set of
tags, each tag representing a particular security concern (e.g.
S = fmedicalg, I = fsanitisedg). Tags are dened as re-
quired in order to represent policy, for example, relating to
how personal medical data can ow. The security context
of an entity is dened as the state of its two labels, S and
I. The ow of data between entities composing the systems
is only allowed towards equally or more constrained entities
in order to guarantee for example, the proper usage of data.
These requirements are captured in the following con-
straints, which are applied on every data ow from an entity
A to an entity B:
A! B, i fS(A)  S(B) ^ I(B)  I(A)g
Creation ows. If an entity creates an entity (active or
passive), the created entity inherits the labels of its parents.
In OS-level IFC enforcement, examples of entity creation
include a process creating a le, and forking a child process.
Privileges for label change. In addition to their S and
I labels, certain entities may have privileges to add and/or
remove tags from these labels. An active entity may have
four privilege tag sets in addition to its security context.
These indicate its privilege to add and/or remove tags in
the sets to/from its S and I labels. Though a created entity
inherits the labels (security context) of its creator, privileges
are not inherited and have to be passed explicitly.
Tag Ownership. In some IFC models [59], the concept
of tag ownership is used to assign privileges to an entity.
Privileges must be passed on with care, especially a privilege
to remove a tag from a label (see below).
Security contexts. The security context of an entity
is its pair of labels, S and I. A security context domain
comprises entities with the same labels. The ow of data
can therefore be within a security context domain or into
a more constrained domain. Once data has owed into a
more constrained domain, further ows are conned to that
domain or into increasingly constrained domains. For exam-
S = {s1}I = ∅
S = {s1, s2}I = ∅
S = {s3}I = ∅
S = ∅I = {i1}Declassifier/Endorser Entity
Allowed Flow
Prevented Flow
Figure 3: Declassication and endorsement
ple, Fig. 3 shows that data tagged as s1 can ow to an entity
tagged with S = fs1; s2g but then can only ow within the
S = fs1; s2g domain. Generally, building a system with
increasing constraints can lead to situations of \label creep".
In practice, perhaps after a certain time has elapsed, secret
data may need to be made publicly available, or when data
has gone through an encryption or anonymisation process it
is allowed to ow more freely. To achieve these things, an
IFC system needs to support more complex ow policies.
Certain entities within an IFC system have privileges to
modify their labels to transfer information across security
contexts. An entity changing its security context is called
a declassier when it modies secrecy constraints, and an
endorser when it modies integrity constraints.
Endorsers/declassiers can be seen as trusted gateways
between security context domains, where IFC constraints
would otherwise prohibit a direct ow (see Fig. 3). Such
gateways can help ensure that regulation is enforced, e.g.,
medical data might only ow to a research domain if it has
gone through a declassier that applies a specied anonymi-
sation algorithm. As well as such transformation of the data,
checks such as the time the data is authorised to be released
might also be needed. These gateway processes will play a
crucial role in enforcing policy at scale, as discussed in [66].
7 IFC’s potential for the IoT
We now present a medical home-monitoring example, to
show the potential of IFC in an IoT environment. For this
example we assume policy is dened by the hospital, in terms
of any access control credentials and IFC tags, and that mid-
dleware manages the components.
Fig. 4 shows a scenario where patients are discharged from
hospital to home monitoring. Each patient has a dedicated
Hospital Data Analyser to analyse and archive some of their
data, which is sent in certain circumstances. If this compo-
nent detects that a medical condition needs attention, hos-
pital sta are alerted and the home sensors may be actu-
ated to sample more frequently, as shown in Fig. 7. To en-
sure condentiality, Ann's device has secrecy tags medical
and ann. Only a component with these tags can receive
data from Ann's device. The Analyser can only receive data
in hospital-standard format from consenting patients, indi-
cated by the integrity tags hosp-dev and consent . Ann's de-
vice is issued by the hospital and is tagged hosp-dev . Fig. 4
shows that data from Zeb cannot ow to Ann's Analyser,
failing both the secrecy and integrity checks (both of which
must be satised for a ow to occur).
Fig. 5 shows a component that sanitises non-standard in-
put. It acts as an endorser, being privileged to input non-
standard data tagged with e.g. I = fzeb-dev ; consentg, con-
vert the data to the required format then change its security
context (a privileged action) so that Zeb's data can ow to
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 Ann’s Home Monitoring Sensors 
 S = {medical, ann} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
check destination S has 
      medical, ann 
Zeb’s Home Monitoring Sensors 
 S = {medical, zeb} I = {zeb-dev, consent} 
    Ann’s (Hospital-based) Data Analyser  
 S = {medical, ann} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
check source I has   
hosp-dev, consent 
X" Illegal flow [prevented] destination S has no zeb 
source I has no hosp-dev 
Figure 4: Home monitoring information ow
his Hospital Data Analyser. This process chain, from sensor
through endorser to analyser is invoked dynamically when-
ever data should be transferred to the Analyser.
Note that even within this single application (home mon-
itoring), access control alone cannot capture the fact that
the sanitising component can receive data from Zeb's non-
standard device when in one security context and can send
data to the analyser only after changing its security context.
3 
Zeb’s Home Monitoring Sensors 
S = {medical, zeb} I = {zeb-dev, consent} 
 Zeb’s (Hospital-based) Data Analyser 
S = {medical, zeb} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
 S = {medical, zeb} I = {zeb-dev, consent}  
Device Input Sanitiser 
S = {medical, zeb} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
Input Sanitiser sets up its  
security context to read Zeb’s  
non-standard data. 
It changes its security context to 
output data in standard format 
to the Data Analyser. 
Figure 5: Endorsement in IFC
Fig. 6 illustrates declassication. It shows a component
that generates statistics about the home monitoring initia-
tive. Patients are assured that their personal data will not
be discernible from the statistics; and regulation and policy
dictate that the statistical use must entail anonymisation
(according to some approved algorithm). We rst see the
statistics generator labelled to be able to read the personal
data from all the patients. It carries out anonymisation
and statistics generation then changes its security context
to S = fmedical ; statsg; I = fanong, before outputting its
results to management (similarly labelled). Management
cannot see patients' data directly.
Again, note that standard access controls alone cannot
enforce the policy that only after the data is anonymised
can it ow to management. The IFC enforcement logs will
show that the statistics generator changed its security con-
text before passing on the data. If a leak of personal data is
claimed, the audit logs can be inspected to check for all ows
relating to that data, and the statistics generating compo-
nent's algorithm can be investigated.
  
    Ann’s Home Monitoring Sensors 
 S = {medical, ann} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
 S = {medical, ann, ……., zeb} I = {hosp-dev, consent} 
Hospital Home-Monitoring Statistics Generator  
                      S = {medical, stats} I = {anon} 
output can only go to appropriately labelled process   
(standardised) data 
from other patients   
          Ward Manager 
 S = {medical, stats} I = {anon} 
Monitor changes  
its security context 
before output 
The Ward Manager cannot read  
individual patient data   
Figure 6: Declassication in IFC
A high-level overview of the entire home monitoring sys-
tem is shown in Fig. 7. The patients' Data Analysers (Ann's
is shown) monitor their conditions and if a medical emer-
gency is detected, policy must come into force (red arrows)
to alert emergency services and to change the monitoring pa-
rameters by an actuation command. Here, an application-
aware policy engine triggers the middleware to set up the
required new connections and set the security regime for the
relevant components to ensure a compliant system. Manag-
ing IFC tags is discussed in x8 and as a challenge in x9.
Appropriately tagged components can be added, e.g. for
medical research into dierent diseases. The example could
be extended with patients needing to give consent for par-
ticular types of medical research, captured in the integrity
tags of their data, and in the components handling the data;
again an aspect of the challenges (in x9).
Ann’s Monitoring Sensors 
Hospital Home-Monitoring  
Statistics Generator  
Ward Manager 
data analyser 
detects emergency   
Zeb’s Monitoring Sensors 
 Input Sanitiser 
Ann’s Data Analyser Zeb’s Data Analyser 
etc. …. 
etc. …. 
emergency 
doctor 
Medical Research  
Statistics Generator  
Medical  
Researcher   
Medical  
Researcher   
new 
components 
emergency 
actuations   
Figure 7: A home monitoring system
These examples motivate the use of IFC for protected data
sharing in the IoT to augment conventional (principal cf.
data-centric) access controls. Concerns 1, 2 and 3 of x3 are
addressed directly, and IFC contributes to meeting Concerns
4, 5 and 6, discussed in x9.
8 Work towards the vision
We argue that the IoT-wide application of IFC will assist
with issues of data management, and we have shown its
conceptual t by means of an example. However, the vi-
sion of enabling a policy-driven, and therefore more legally-
compliant IoT must be grounded in practical realities. To-
wards this, we now describe our related systems experi-
ence of dynamically recongurable MW, through work on
SBUS [82], and on IFC for cloud, though CamFlow [69].
8.1 Dynamically reconfigurable MW
The importance of MW with reconguration capabilities,
towards enabling a more legally-compliant IoT, is that it
allows system components to be changed and adapted when
and where appropriate. This enables the system to accord
with the general governance regime.
As described in x5.2, in a data management context we
consider reconguration functionality as providing the means
to: (a) change security regimes of components to dene the
bounds within which data ows take place; and (b) actively
eect security operations by establishing or ceasing interac-
tions, to directly initiate or prevent certain data ows.
Through our work on SBUS [82], we have long consid-
ered the practical aspects of recongurable MW. SBUS has
a general AC regime to govern interactions. This policy, en-
capsulating attributes of principals and context, is enforced
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at the granularity of message type,2 and can be recongured.
Of particular relevance here is that SBUS not only sup-
ports system components reconguring their own state; but
importantly, allows reconguration actions to be issued by
third parties. That is, certain components can instruct oth-
ers to undertake recongurations and actions.
These third-party instructions are executed as though the
application had initiated them; though they occur inde-
pendently from the application logic of the component be-
ing recongured. The reconguration commands are issued
through the messaging system via control messages. This is
shown in Fig. 8. Reconguration commands are subject to
the same general AC regime, to ensure that recongurations
are only actioned when received from trusted third parties.
1.#Reconﬁgura.on#
#######command# Lsdfasasfsfasafsfsaafsasfas&
2.#Resul.ng#
##interac.on#
Policy&Engine&(PE)& Component&A& Component&B&
Lsdfasasfsfasafs sa fsasfas&
Figure 8: Third-party reconguration: a control
message initiating a new interaction
The importance of this approach to reconguration is that
it allows components to be externally managed. This paves
the way for policy to apply across systems. That is, policy
actions can entail the issuing of reconguration instructions
to aect a range of components, in order to make the broader
system behave according to high-level goals.
Such capabilities will be crucial for enabling IFC to apply
at scale. Specically, we anticipate recongurations will be
the means to change components' security contexts, assign/
remove privileges, etc. ((a), above); and also to enable trans-
parent and dynamic system chain management ((b), above),
for instance, to automatically include various declassiers/
endorsers and associated transformation operations to allow
data to ow across IFC security context domains [66].
In practice, we envisage policy engines, entities that en-
capsulate a range of related policies, monitor environments
and use the MW's remote-reconguration functionality to
issue instructions to components, when/where necessary, to
ensure system behaviour remains appropriate over time. For
instance, in [81] we explored how policy engines in an as-
sisted living environment could recongure a range of system
components to enact an appropriate emergency response.
8.2 CamFlow: IFC for cloud
CamFlow [68, 69] realises the IFC model described in x6 to
provide the continuous protection of data as it ows end-to-
end through a PaaS cloud. This is achieved by enforcing IFC
(1) at the OS kernel level, for entities co-hosted in the same
OS instance, including for inter-process communication; and
(2) at a message-passing level, for entities hosted by dierent
OS instances (cross-machine). Therefore in CamFlow, IFC
policy is enforced across cloud-hosted applications.
An underlying assumption is that the IFC implementa-
tion (and therefore the cloud-provider) is trusted. We argue
that this is reasonable in a cloud context, because a cloud
provider is generally more trustworthy, has a greater tech-
nical capability, and is more visible to regulators than ten-
ants and their applications. Further, this means that cloud-
hosted parties can collaborate without trusting each other,
2Privileges, credentials and context are represented as X.509
certicates, managed and assigned using the standard mech-
anisms of the certicate infrastructure.
so long as they all trust the underlying IFC enforcement
mechanism of the platform.
8.2.1 OS-level IFC enforcement
CamFlow provides a kernel level IFC-enforcement capabil-
ity, to both enforce (control) and record data ows between
processes and kernel objects (e.g. les, pipes, etc.).3 This is
implemented as a Linux Security Module [92] (LSM). LSMs
use security hooks that are invoked on system calls to de-
cide whether a call is allowed to proceed. LSMs associate
with each kernel object a structure for storing security meta-
data comprising the object's security context and privileges
(x6). Importantly, LSMs can be incorporated with limited
overhead, leaving the rest of the kernel unaltered and sys-
tem calls unchanged. This approach means IFC can be en-
forced without any application rework, intervention or even
awareness. Further, all data ows can be tracked to enable
audit, provenance and potentially demonstrate compliance
with contracts and regulations. We have shown the LSM
performance overhead to be minimal [68].
The LSM is simply the IFC enforcement mechanism. At a
higher level, in decentralised IFC, labels and tags are dened
for applications in order to reect policy, and an application
instance must be set up in an appropriate security context.
8.2.2 Cross-machine enforcement
The LSM can only enforce IFC within the context of the
local OS. Unmediated external communication of labelled
processes is prevented, since the context of security across
the remote machine/network is unknown to the kernel.
Transfers across machines are therefore managed by a
trusted substrate. This substrate represents an extension
of our work in SBUS, where each communicating entity (ap-
plication process) is associated with a messaging substrate
process for external transfers. A substrate process is aware
of the security context of the application process it serves,
and enforces IFC in its dealings with the substrate processes
of other applications. Fig. 9 shows the architecture.
Camflow-LSM
User Space
Kernel Space
Application Process [S, I]
Kernel
Hardware
CamFlow-Messaging [S, I]
TPM
Message [S, I]
R
e
m
o
te
M
a
ch
in
e
Figure 9: CamFlow architecture
Enforcement occurs on the establishment of communica-
tion (messaging) channels. A channel is only established if
the policy allows, i.e. the tags of the components accord.
Specically, this involves augmenting the standard MW AC
(principal and contextual policy) enforcement with a subse-
quent evaluation of IFC policy that encapsulates the data-
centric constraints. This is monitored throughout the con-
nection's lifetime, where an entity changing its security con-
text triggers re-evaluation (enforcement). Note, the impacts
of externally reconguring IFC policy as described in x8.1
have not been explored, remaining an open challenge (x9).
Message-specic policy. Though CamFlow enables en-
forcement without application intervention, there may be
some circumstances where an application wishes to dene
its own high-level IFC policy. Messages are strongly typed,
3See www.camow.org for the LSM IFC implementation.
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consisting of a set of named and typed attributes, and cer-
tain message types, or attributes thereof, can be more sen-
sitive than others; e.g. for a message type person, attribute
name is likely more sensitive than country .
To achieve these more granular controls, additional tags
can be dened that only exist at the messaging level, aug-
menting the OS-level security context. This is shown in
Fig. 10, where tag C is message-layer specic. Enforcement
may entail source quenching, in that messages/attribute val-
ues are not transferred if the tags of each party do not ac-
cord. This represents the integration and enforcement of
IFC by systems operating at dierent technical levels. The
ability for IFC policy to interoperate, and be enforced at
dierent levels is crucial for enabling IFC to apply at scale.
S:{A,B}	
LSM	
Analyser	
VM	2	
App	
LSM	
S:{A,B}	
S:{A,B,C}	
MSG	
App	 App	
LSM	
S:{A,B}	
S:{A,B,C}	
MSG	
LSM	
S:{A,B}	
VM	1	
IFC	enforcement	point	
Data	ﬂow	
Figure 10: A messaging substrate (MSG) enforcing
an additional app-specic policy (tag C)
8.3 Tracking data flow: provenance and audit
F1 F2
F3
F4
P1
P2
A1 A2
Data itemProcess
Agent
Information Flow
Controlled by
Figure 11: Fragment of an audit graph
A data provenance system assists in understanding data
lifecycles: how was it created? when? by whom? how was
it manipulated? [23]. Provenance systems generate audit
graphs (a fragment is shown in Fig. 11), that represent the
data items (F ), transformation processes (P ) and agents (A)
(owners/managers) involved in generating and transferring
certain data. These graphs are useful in forensic analysis,
e.g. determining how a le was generated [51].
As both provenance and IFC concern the ow of informa-
tion between entities, the logs generated during IFC enforce-
ment are a natural source of provenance information. This
was explored in [68], where we showed how a popular graph
database (Neo4J4) and visualisation tool (Cytoscape5) can
be used to analyse IFC audit data. Logs can be made more
trustworthy by, for example, using hardware cryptographic
support [6] as discussed in x4.
It follows that in addition to controlling data ows, IFC
enforcement can produce provenance-like data that allows
information transfers to be audited. These audits can be
used to demonstrate system adherence to policy, and there-
fore compliance with various legal obligations.
4http://neo4j.com/
5http://js.cytoscape.org/
9 Moving forward
We have described the nature of IoT data sharing, consider-
ing its dynamic, ad hoc and federated nature, and the need
for data exchanges to be managed in order to ensure those
involved in the IoT comply with their legal obligations. Our
big idea is that IFC|enabling data ow-centric control and
audit|working with a middleware providing dynamic re-
congurable management functionality, oers real potential
towards realising the vision of a legally-complaint IoT.
9.1 From clouds to the IoT
Our work on IFC for PaaS clouds shows IFC as a viable tech-
nology. This, however, was based on the assumption that the
OS (cloud-provider) is trusted, possibly backed by hardware
(see [67], x4)|justiable given cloud is often an environment
under a single domain of administrative control. Our initial
work indicates that IFC-encoded policy can be both simple
and expressive. We have also explored [86] how IFC might
address enforcement of, and compliance with, the emerging
legal/regulatory framework for cloud services [54].
This work has given us condence that IFC has great po-
tential for better enabling IoT applications to be legally-
compliant, essential for realising the broader IoT vision.
9.2 IFC in meeting IoT data sharing concerns
Let us rst reconsider the potential of IFC for addressing
the concerns presented in x3:
Concern 1 \IoT involves highly sensitive data". Traditional
access control can be used for principal-based, point-based,
application-specic access checks. IFC tags are designed
specically to augment this for continuous access enforce-
ment, including data secrecy and integrity aspects, as noted
for the patient home monitoring example (Figs. 5, 6, 7),
while oering potential for audit and provenance tracking.
Concern 2 \IoT involves actuation". Hardware-based at-
testation and traditional access controls can be augmented
by IFC's integrity tags, designed to ensure the `quality' (e.g.
authority, accuracy, geo-location, etc.) of the actuation com-
mand. This allows not only the issuer and context immedi-
ately surrounding the command to be considered, but also
the chain of ows related to the command, including the
data (e.g. event patterns) that led to the actuation.
Concern 3 \Persistence of policy through composed things".
Assuming policy permits some composition of components,
IFC can enforce all ows between them, and oer data pro-
tection beyond the lifetime of the composition (and the com-
ponents involved). This assumes that tags are allocated to
authorised components before ows can take place.
Concern 4 \Data quality and provenance". IFC integrity
tags are designed to ensure and enforce data quality prop-
erties, e.g. as shown in Fig. 5 to indicate data has been con-
verted to a standard format. In general, integrity tags are
assigned after data has been validated. This might be after
hardware certication of certain properties (as discussed in
x4). For example, [44] uses hardware cryptographic support
and RFID tracking to certify the physical (GPS) location of
machines. A similar mechanism could be used to guarantee
sensor accuracy or other physical properties.
For data provenance, IFC checks are carried out on every
attempted ow. This facilitates the creation of logs record-
ing all attempted and permitted ows. Such information
provides the means to demonstrate that user policies have
been enforced and regulations have been complied with. It
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also provides a basis for investigating attacks, the eects of
which may be conned by the IFC control regime.
Concern 5 \Data aggregation, inference and analytics". The
problem of unintended and unforeseen inference is unsolved
and involves keeping a step ahead of ever-more sophisticated
algorithms. IFC can contribute by logging where data trav-
els, and when combined with other data [86]. Regulation is
involved in controlling analytics and IFC can assist in mak-
ing evident what data has been used, when and by whom.
Concern 6 \Customisation and context". Declassier/
endorsement processes allow data to ow between security
context domains, where data ows would otherwise be pro-
hibited. This allows constraints on data to change over
time, as appropriate to the situation. For example, after
a certain period of time, governmental data previously con-
sidered secret should become public. This involves changing
constraints, through a managed, explicit process of an entity
modifying its security context to declassify the data.
9.3 Research challenges
The discussion of x9.2 considers the potential of IFC for
meeting specic IoT concerns. The fundamental challenge
in realising the big idea is making IFC apply at scale, given:
1. The heterogenous nature of the chains of IoT compo-
nents, which exist across federated domains of admin-
istration; and
2. The IoT environments are long-lived, yet highly dy-
namic.
Therefore we believe MW with reconguration capabili-
ties has a clear role to play. To reiterate, MW can naturally
operate across system and administrative boundaries, man-
aging interactions, and therefore is highly appropriate for
integrating IFC functionality. By enabling external recon-
guration, the security policy of components can be changed
and adapted to ensure that the system remains compliant
over time, and given changes in circumstances. This is cru-
cial for realising a legally-compliant IoT.
However, there are a number of signicant challenges that
must rst be overcome to realise the grand vision; given
these concern dynamism and cross-system aspects, we be-
lieve the middleware community is well placed to contribute.
We now summarise some key areas for research.
Challenge 1: Global policy. For security policy to apply
at scale, throughout the IoT, there is a need for a global pol-
icy representation, including tag and privilege descriptions,
and a universal means for reconguring components.
Current IFC implementations have privileged application
managers that can create application-specic IFC tags [69].
In general, privileged processes can arbitrarily create tags
that may be application-/system-specic, e.g. data in an EU
cloud may be tagged as such, to comply with regulation that
personal data must not leave the EU [39,86]. However, data
can only ow after negotiation and subsequent propagation
of tags, so this must be managed. Though some policies may
only be relevant within a particular scope (e.g. an applica-
tion), others may be globally applicable, and interactions
may occur with entities never before encountered.
In short, complexity is exacerbated when moving beyond
the single administrative domain of a cloud service. There-
fore, there must be the potential for (certain) security policy
to potentially apply to any `thing', through changes in con-
text, wherever it lies, in any IoT processing chain. With tags,
one way forward may be approaches akin to DNS and/or
based on PKI, though overheads will be a consideration.
There is also the need for reconguration operations to
be standardised, to allow components' security policy to be
changed where necessary, to align with broader, system-wide
requirements. Though we argue that the MW should pro-
vide the reconguration functionality, the precise denition
and nature of the operations must be globally understood.
Also relevant is that policy can apply at dierent levels of
abstraction; e.g. in our own work (x8), translation is neces-
sary between the kernel's tag representation and that of the
messaging substrate that deals with other machines. This
requires consideration as more technologies are involved.
Challenge 2: Dening policy. Our discussion of the
viability of our big idea has focussed on the mechanism for
enforcement. However, for the vision to be realised, there is
a clear need for suitable, intuitive means for IFC tags, privi-
leges and reconguration policy to be expressed, so that obli-
gations can be captured and adhered to. Work concerning
policy authoring interfaces and templates can be relevant,
as is work on ontologies that relate to policy semantics. It is
also important to recognise that the tags may themselves be
sensitive e.g. where a tag implies a particular medical con-
dition. Therefore, the visibility of policy specications may
also need to be controlled.
Challenge 3: Managing reconguration. We argue
that reconguration mechanisms are required given that sys-
tems are long lived and requirements will change over time.
Policy uses reconguration functionality to respond to
changing circumstances, where actions are taken on patterns
of events, e.g. detected by complex-event methods or ma-
chine learning. Therefore representing and managing context
is an ongoing challenge, particularly given the IoT's scale.
Beyond context, of crucial importance is how these re-
congurations are properly managed|not least as `things'
can be reused, repurposed, mobile, shared, and usage can
vary. Investigation is required on how the continuous data-
centric control mechanisms resolve with more general AC,
and how recongurations can be used to set up security con-
texts for new applications and service-composition lifecycles,
and manage these for dynamic application. In particular,
IFC imposes a stringent regime, where deliberate behaviours
(endorsement/declassication) must be undertaken for data
to ow beyond dened boundaries. How the external recon-
guration of IFC policy (label assignment, privileges) issued
by others should be managed to avoid components reaching
an inconsistent state, through the updated policy regime,
is an open challenge. Much work is required on the feed-
back loops between the policy, reconguration/enforcement
mechanisms and components.
Challenge 4: Authority and conict. Given the IoT
is federated by nature, one issue concerns managing who
is able to dene and maintain (recongure) policy. Some
`things' are owned by individuals, e.g. wearables; some are
shared, e.g. the occupants of a home may all have the right
to control certain `things' therein; and some devices have
delegated ownership, e.g., a health service may loan devices
to patients, or a company to employees. There may also
be ad hoc situations, in which some authority is given tem-
porarily, e.g. only while physically in a particular location.
Related is that federation means that policy will conict,
particularly as many of these considerations will be contex-
tual and policy can change. We have previously considered
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dynamic policy conict [83], including policy prioritisation
and override, but only where the conict is within a single
administrative domain. Work is certainly required on policy
conict resolution, e.g. standardisation, authoring interfaces
and/or mechanisms for runtime negotiation and resolution.
Challenge 5: Trusted enforcement. Clearly a pol-
icy enforcement infrastructure must be trustworthy, partic-
ularly if the goal is to assist with compliance. In x8.2 we
mentioned that a cloud provider is likely to be trusted and
therefore it may be reasonable that the OS kernel is part
of a trusted computing base for enforcing IFC, especially if
hardware-backed [67]. This can motivate sharing between
applications hosted in the cloud, as they need only trust the
cloud provider's enforcement mechanism.
While this assists some forms of cloud-mediated IoT ser-
vices, enabling trust in the wider IoT environment is chal-
lenging. Federation means a variety of parties will own, con-
trol and manage system components, and the physical na-
ture of `things' raises issues of system integrity (tampering).
Further, there may be dynamically-formed interactions with
components never before seen, managed by parties relatively
unknown. Hardware-based trust approaches, e.g. those de-
scribed in x4, show promise by improving the level of trust
and decreasing the size of the trusted software base [5,17,61].
Resource constraints are another consideration: some de-
vices may have a limited ability to store and enforce policy.
Of course, gateway components could be used to mediate
data ows. However, substantial work is required on what
aspects of policy management and enforcement can be dele-
gated, ooaded, distributed and federated, to meet resource
constraints, while ensuring adequate levels of trust.
Challenge 6: Audit and provenance for compliance.
Our goal of a legally-compliant IoT is based on the ability
to provide evidence that data management responsibilities
are being met. We described how IFC facilitates data prove-
nance, including when data is amalgamated with other data,
providing evidence for audit and compliance.
Though we have explored audit in a single administrative
domain (x8.3) managing provenance in IoT is dicult, due to
its federated and dynamic nature. Questions include: What
should be recorded, and when? How to deal with possi-
ble audit `gaps', where components are no longer accessible,
intermittently connected or mobile? Are there any special
considerations where interactions are one-o and ad hoc?
How does provenance work, given the resource constraints
of `things'? When can logs safely be pruned? Can logs be
ooaded to others for distributed audit, and how should this
be managed? Can audit be reconciled with legal obligations
for non-disclosure, e.g. actions by law enforcement?
The above challenges, though signicant, are within scope of
the middleware research community's expertise. Our discus-
sion concerns the IoT, but work in such areas will assist in
building more legally-compliant systems in general, which is
of increasing importance given ongoing legal developments.
10 Related Work
Surveys have shown that issues concerning security, privacy
and data management are the key research challenges for
the IoT [8,34,89], and compliance is clearly related [85]. We
now summarise areas of related research.
10.1 Current IoT security research
The IoT raises security challenges at all technical levels [75].
There is much work on establishing secure communication
channels between `things' [31,37]; standards for this purpose
are summarised in [46]. Others have designed access control
schemes specically for IoT [25, 63], and some research fo-
cuses on lightweight authentication mechanisms [49,65,74].
These approaches, however, do not consider protecting
data beyond a particular interaction, i.e. do not provide con-
tinuous, system-wide guarantees. They also tend to focus on
adapting existing techniques (x4) to resource-constrained de-
vices, rather than devising new approaches towards general
IoT requirements. Such work is orthogonal to, but comple-
ments our vision, e.g. helping to integrate low-end devices.
It is generally recognised that high-level management con-
cerns, which at a systems level relate particularly to issues
of policy, reconguration and context management, remain
open issues given IoT's massive scale [34,89].
10.2 Middleware for the IoT
Middleware has a clear role in the IoT [13] to assist with is-
sues of interoperability, service composition, heterogeneity,
layers of abstraction, security/privacy, context-awareness,
resource management, QoS, etc. In this big ideas paper, we
have established additional requirements for IoT, relating to
continuous system-wide policy enforcement to enable legal
compliance. These concerns align with the general directions
of emerging middleware, towards managing future complex
and dependable systems [43]. To place our idea in context,
we briey outline the most relevant areas.
Service composition and adaptive middleware. Ser-
vice composition entails the combination of services (or sys-
tem components) to realise particular functionality [42]. This
typically involves taking an application level task (request)
and mapping it to a number of services [45], managing re-
source allocation and task distribution/ordering. Service
composition is important for IoT, where coordinating and
orchestrating `things' helps meet functional goals. As such,
there is work, e.g. [33,91] on supporting service composition
at scale, accounting for high levels of heterogeneity.
Middleware allowing dynamic conguration and customi-
sation is known as adaptive [76] or reective [48]. These ap-
proaches expose the current system conguration and state,
enabling recongurations to full resource or QoS require-
ments [1]. Recongurations may be initiated by applications
themselves, or by managers of lower-level (e.g. network)/
shared infrastructure. Service composition is closely related,
as recongurations enable orchestrations to be eected.
This paper argues that recongurations are necessary for
IoT, to help manage the dynamic runtime environment. Both
adaptive and service composition aspects are useful in help-
ing to recongure and orchestrate components, to realise
particular functionality. However, there is also the need for
higher level controls through policy, not only to serve appli-
cation requirements, but broader policy requirements across
applications, systems and services.
Specically, we see the need for complementary control
mechanisms that apply continuously. That is, data manage-
ment policy must operate beyond the scope of a particular
service composition to: (1) regulate the data ows within
any composition, and in, out and/or between them, system-
wide; and (2) account for any resulting data that may exist
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well beyond the lifetime of the composition. Secondly, there
must be means to recongure, and adapt the policy itself.
Policy-based systems. There is some work on higher-level
policy enforcement [88]. Policy models, however, typically
involve imposing an architectural or environmental struc-
ture. For example, self-managed cells [27] were proposed to
bind a group of `things' in order to manage the interactions
with other cells, and in [56] agents are grouped with trusted
controllers. Other constraints may be imposed, e.g. forcing
a particular form of interaction [53,83,93].
We have argued the case for a policy-driven IoT, however
IoT requires systems to be open and exible. Thus, any
policy-based infrastructure must avoid imposing restrictive
modelling, design or interaction constraints, so that any re-
quired structuring is dictated by users. That is, it is im-
portant that data ow policy is enforced regardless of any
system structure, for the entire lifecycle of the data. Further,
having a policy model that is deliberately at enables decen-
tralised and exible, granular policy that can apply directly,
rather than be limited by layers of abstraction.
Sticky policies have been proposed to achieve end-to-end
control over data [21, 71], where data is encrypted along
with the policy to be applied to that data. To obtain the
decryption key from a Trusted Authority, a party must agree
to enforce the policy. Sticky policies aim at a high level of
abstraction, where policy denition and interpretation are
comparatively heavyweight. Further, the approach is trust-
based with no audit of compliance; there are no means to
ensure the proper usage of data once decrypted.
Note that translating law into a machine understandable
form is an active area of research of the computational law
community [16, 50]. Though such work typically does not
consider systems-level enforcement, it could play a useful
role in assisting policy denition.
Representing context. IoT is dynamic and data-driven,
therefore context is a key consideration [72]. Policy is inher-
ently contextual, dened to be enforced in particular circum-
stances. Therefore, a richer representation of state allows for
more granular and expressive policy.
A well-structured context model enables analysis and rea-
soning over policy behaviours, useful for determining op-
erational semantics, potential policy or contextual errors/
omissions. There are various approaches enabling complex
state representations [12, 18]. Ontological approaches show
particular promise [20, 36], by allowing context, tags, privi-
leges, etc. to be dened, based on semantics. However, given
the scale of IoT, managing context is an ongoing concern; in-
deed, agreeing a common vocabulary/coding scheme, even
for subareas of a heterogeneous IoT is challenging [64].
10.3 IFC in the IoT
A survey of IFC implementations is given in [9]. The ma-
jority of approaches concern enforcement within a local ma-
chine; very few consider IFC across machines [24,79,95], and
these tend to be limited in scope and/or impose a certain
form of system structuring (see [84] for more discussion).
Our own work (x8) is alone in proposing IFC for cloud com-
puting. To our knowledge, IFC has not been considered
for the widely-distributed, highly dynamic environment of
the IoT, which as this paper describes, entails a number of
signicant research challenges.
10.4 Audit and provenance for the IoT
It is often acknowledged that audit will be important for the
IoT, but there is little work in the area. Policy enforcement,
coupled with audit for a widely distributed context, is yet
to be addressed.
Provenance tools associated with OSs or hypervisors [52,
58, 73] aim at logging data at a lower systems-level, useful
for system administration. Cloudopsy [94], focusses on the
visualisation of information ows for end users, for investiga-
tion of privacy issues, but without addressing enforcement.
SPADE [32] provides graph-based models of the ow of sci-
entic data in grid computing, following the Open Prove-
nance Model.6 The EU Compose project proposes a Prove-
nance Data Model for the IoT [14]; this reinforces the need
for condentiality and integrity enforcement mechanisms.
11 Conclusion
System design is increasingly aected by the development
and application of law and regulation, particularly with re-
gard to data management. The future IoT will be a highly
distributed, dynamic, data-driven environment, yet compli-
ance with data management obligations must be demon-
strated during system operation.
We have argued that a new approach must be taken to
enable the big idea of a legally-compliant IoT. This is where
policy, aligning with legal obligations, is able to drive and
manage system behaviour, and where the infrastructure pro-
vides evidence to assist in demonstrating compliance.
Given that the IoT is driven by the exchange of data,
we feel that middleware with reconguration capabilities,
integrated with IFC, represents a promising way forward.
This is by providing the means to support managed and
adaptable data sharing policy, the continuous monitoring
and management of data ows, and logging for compliance
and audit. We have shown the viability of IFC as a systems
technology, in the context of a trusted cloud. However, the
scale and dynamic nature of the IoT means major research
challenges remain in a number of areas, to enable such tech-
nology to realise a legally-compliant IoT.
Though such research is, without doubt, relevant for max-
imising the IoT's potential, we believe work in the areas de-
scribed would also identify new directions for investigation,
leading to a new, interdisciplinary general research topic:
\legally-compliant distributed systems".
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